added security module

This commit is contained in:
Moritz Böhme 2021-09-30 19:41:08 +02:00
parent 90751ed9a8
commit 79fa032a15
2 changed files with 82 additions and 15 deletions

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@ -1,33 +1,28 @@
{ lib, pkgs, ... }:
{
imports = [
./apps
./cli
./desktop
./services
];
imports = [ ./apps ./cli ./desktop ./services ./security.nix ];
# USERS
users.users.moritz = {
shell = pkgs.zsh;
isNormalUser = true;
home = "/home/moritz";
extraGroups = [ "wheel" "networkmanager" "video" ]; # Enable sudo for the user.
extraGroups =
[ "wheel" "networkmanager" "video" ]; # Enable sudo for the user.
};
fonts.fonts = with pkgs; [
(nerdfonts.override { fonts = [ "FiraCode" "DroidSansMono" "JetBrainsMono" ]; })
fonts.fonts = with pkgs;
[
(nerdfonts.override {
fonts = [ "FiraCode" "DroidSansMono" "JetBrainsMono" ];
})
];
time.timeZone = "Europe/Berlin";
# PACKAGES
environment.systemPackages = with pkgs; [
vim
wget
firefox
];
environment.systemPackages = with pkgs; [ vim wget firefox ];
home-manager.users.moritz = {
# Let Home Manager install and manage itself.

72
modules/security.nix Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
{ config, lib, ... }:
{
## System security tweaks
# sets hidepid=2 on /proc (make process info visible only to owning user)
# NOTE Was removed on nixpkgs-unstable because it doesn't do anything
# security.hideProcessInformation = true;
# Prevent replacing the running kernel w/o reboot
security.protectKernelImage = true;
# tmpfs = /tmp is mounted in ram. Doing so makes temp file management speedy
# on ssd systems, and volatile! Because it's wiped on reboot.
boot.tmpOnTmpfs = lib.mkDefault true;
# If not using tmpfs, which is naturally purged on reboot, we must clean it
# /tmp ourselves. /tmp should be volatile storage!
boot.cleanTmpDir = lib.mkDefault (!config.boot.tmpOnTmpfs);
# Fix a security hole in place for backwards compatibility. See desc in
# nixpkgs/nixos/modules/system/boot/loader/systemd-boot/systemd-boot.nix
boot.loader.systemd-boot.editor = false;
boot.kernel.sysctl = {
# The Magic SysRq key is a key combo that allows users connected to the
# system console of a Linux kernel to perform some low-level commands.
# Disable it, since we don't need it, and is a potential security concern.
"kernel.sysrq" = 0;
# Restrict dmesg access for normal users
"kernel.dmesg_restrict" = 1;
# Restrict printing of kernel addresses
"kernel.kptr_restrict" = 2;
## TCP hardening
# Prevent bogus ICMP errors from filling up logs.
"net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses" = 1;
# Reverse path filtering causes the kernel to do source validation of
# packets received from all interfaces. This can mitigate IP spoofing.
"net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter" = 1;
"net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter" = 1;
# Do not accept IP source route packets (we're not a router)
"net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route" = 0;
"net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route" = 0;
# Don't send ICMP redirects (again, we're on a router)
"net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects" = 0;
"net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects" = 0;
# Refuse ICMP redirects (MITM mitigations)
"net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects" = 0;
"net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects" = 0;
"net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects" = 0;
"net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects" = 0;
"net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects" = 0;
"net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects" = 0;
# Protects against SYN flood attacks
"net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies" = 1;
# Incomplete protection again TIME-WAIT assassination
"net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337" = 1;
## TCP optimization
# TCP Fast Open is a TCP extension that reduces network latency by packing
# data in the senders initial TCP SYN. Setting 3 = enable TCP Fast Open for
# both incoming and outgoing connections:
"net.ipv4.tcp_fastopen" = 3;
# Bufferbloat mitigations + slight improvement in throughput & latency
"net.ipv4.tcp_congestion_control" = "bbr";
"net.core.default_qdisc" = "cake";
};
boot.kernelModules = [ "tcp_bbr" ];
# So we don't have to do this later...
security.acme.acceptTerms = true;
}